44 Formation of the image
Taeke
de Jong, Jürgen Rosemann
44.1 Constants in chaos................................................ 1
44.2 'Inside' and 'outside'............................................... 1
44.3 'True' and 'possible to express'............................. 2
44.4 Intersection of senses........................................... 3
44.5 Imagination by intervention..................................... 3
44.6 A series of actions................................................ 4
44.7 Setting routines in motion....................................... 4
44.8 Creativity and routine............................................. 5
44.9 Creative conceptual capacity................................ 5
44.10 Applied combinatorics............................................ 6
44.11 Conceptualising work or its result......................... 6
44.12 Making imaginations............................................... 6
44.13 More design methods than designers.................... 6
44.14 Idea and environment............................................. 7
This Chapter is an epistemological intermezzo in which psychologists, philosophers and artists enter the discussion (and the picture) regarding formation of the image. This short overview cannot do this topic justice. Positions will be briefly elucidated. Whoever wishes to read more is referred to other literature via the references. From the entire argument, only one pointer towards creativity is given: creativity pre-supposes leaving behind at least one notion otherwise considered self-evident. Furthermore, the idea that formation of the image pre-supposes a goal will be criticised, as this just shifts the issue of creativity to the concept of a "goal". A goal, after all, is an image.
44.1 Constants in chaos
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Figure 1 Continuities in similarities |
The great developmental psychologist Piaget describes
a newborn's visual worldview as a tableau
mouvant of
disconnected shapes and colours (chaos).[1] Similarities and continuities must
first be recognised to
begin to be able to think about the
world. It is not self-evident, for example, that a baby's experience of his
mother from a distance is
the same as his experience of her from
up-close. The visual
impression of
both is completely different. It is only through repeated experience of
amalgamated and formative images in this tableau mouvant that the baby realises this process involves an object that
changes place in perspective outside of one's own body, but that otherwise remains
the same itself (object constancy). What is equally uncertain is the
subsequent distinction between one's own self and something that, on the basis
of externally observed object constancy, leads its own life (objectification). The difference between I and that,
which has been made into an object, has been postulated by Fichte[2] as the first pre-condition for
thinking. The object then temporarily remains a object distinct of the observer: "I see an object". If the child later gives a verbal
description, it becomes an active subject of a
sentence: "the object is yellow".
44.2 'Inside' and 'outside'
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Figure 2 External and internal priority |
A familiar philosophical position proposes
that the difference between what takes place inside and outside of
our thinking is theoretically improvable, that the I is the only thing about
which one can make a statement (solipsism). This is understood in psychiatric
disturbances as autism. This extreme assumption that there is no outside world, certainly raises the question, as an experimental idea, of what
one's own thinking would consist of if there were no conceivable astonishment about some unexpected thing that exists outside of us.
Psychological experiments depriving people
of external stimulation (sensory deprivation[3]) are never endured by volunteers longer than three days, and lead to hallucinations. According to some, forced sensory
deprivation will, based on several known cases with babies and animals[4], lead to death. The neuro-physiological
system requires
external stimuli. If one pre-supposes a stimuli producing
outside world (easy to do), then the question arises where, precisely, the border
lies between the observer and the externally observed. The problem with the
relationship between "inside" and "outside" of our thinking
has been studied in philosophy for 3000 years.
Is the observed only a projection of
our way of seeing, or our underlying ideas (idealism[5], rationalism[6], and anthropocentrism[7], largely developed in continental
Europe) or is there something more in our thinking
than simply everything that has passed through our senses or even through our
mouths[8] (materialism[9], empiricism[10], ecocentrism[11], all of which are largely Anglo-Saxon)? Projecting an idea into a new context is
obvious in design, in the making of artefacts, and in taking action.
44.3 'True' and 'possible to express'
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Figure 3 Magritte, La condition humaine, 1934 |
One finds several
of the many attempts to unify both streams in human thinking in Kant (critical idealism)[12], Husserl (phenomenology)[13], and logical
empiricism (logical positivism, neopositivism). Logical empiricism is now considered the
most widespread foundation of scientific
thinking. Here, the expressability of thoughts in
the form of language (logos, logic) forms the border of pure empiricist thinking. Science is only that which can be communicated.
Wittgenstein ("Wovon
man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen") taught as a Viennese
philosopher in Cambridge (amongst, for example, Russell, Keynes, and Skinner) and was thus also a literal bridge between
continental and Anglo-Saxon thinking. The discovery in (particle) physics[14], biology (animal behaviour theory[15]) and sociology[16] that every reality is
upset by human perception then
set in motion yet another fundamental relativisation of perception.
44.4 Intersection of senses
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Figure 4 Ghirlandaio, Louvre |
According to Piaget, another crucial moment in the formation of
consciousness in child psychology is the pre-supposition that what you see and
feel can be "the same" object. This requires that at least two very
different, even theoretically incomparable impressions from two senses (for
example vision and taste) repeatedly appear at the same time.
Experiments where children are able to feel
something without seeing it and are then shown the same thing
without feeling it lead Piaget to conclude that at the age of approximately
one and a half (for some a bit earlier, for others a bit later), one's conceptual capacity comes into existence. At the intersection of the two synchronous but various (syn-aesthetic) sensory
impressions, the idea (the
concept) liberates itself from an object that one
can immediately feel and see. From that moment onward, one can also imagine
that object without seeing, feeling, hearing, or smelling it.
Considered from this perspective, one has to
see the popular children's game of "peek-a-boo" as a serious string of repeated empirical experiments based on testing the hypothesis (by
means of various sensory impressions) that objects continue to exist even though one does not always see
them. The stereotypical shaking of the head or dancing to and fro goes
hand-in-hand with the way small children will, as soon as they can stand,
devote large and amounts of visual
attention to
the parallax between
the foreground and background of
what they observe. The child will often laugh as a
result, which leads parents and grandparents to intervene, although this laugh
is often not meant for these observers; the child starts to cry when the
outsider affectionately interrupts the child's
experiments. The adult's face in the background is, at
that point, nothing more than an interesting demonstration of the parallax[17] that confirms notions of object constancy.
44.5 Imagination by intervention
An often under-estimated sense has to do
with the use of our locomotor system. Even without feeling, seeing, and
smelling, we can ascertain the relative position of our arms and legs, their
weight, and what they are bearing. This enables coherence in our movements in
space (co-ordination) and in time (synchronisation) and therefore also enables effective taking
of action. Sequential reporting of our other senses on the basis of our actions
(sensory motor system, the empirical
cycle avant la lettre[18]) is, according to Piaget, crucial for the development of the ability
to imagine (conceptual capacity).
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Figure 5 'True' is what works |
After the Second World War, this insight had an enormous influence on education. Since Piaget, more attention was consciously paid to manual dexterity and gymnastics during primary education. Children can now, thanks to his research, get up out of their chairs more frequently during lessons. Many new teaching methods try to use the locomotor system in the formation of concepts. This is perhaps also a call for the use of models in design education. The science of making (technique) may benefit from a scientific notion that avoids the philosophical discussion between empiricists and rationalists by proposing: "'True' is what works" (pragmatism)[19].
44.6 A series of actions
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Figure 6 A series of actions |
Conceptual capacity is defined by the biologists Harrison,
Weiner, Tanner and Barnicot as "the ability to maintain an
overview of a series of actions of which only the first can immediately be executed".[20] One
could add: "and of which only the last brings satisfaction" (yet this
is difficult for an observer to establish). In this respect, people are
different animals. This capability pre-supposes Piaget's definition, but goes
further.
In archaeology, without written sources, discovery
of tools provides proof of the early presence of people, even if various
species also display the beginnings of this kind of capacity.[21] The individual involvement of
intrinsically senseless actions into an overall functional whole is not yet
proof that the sequence of actions is seen in its totality (planning). With instinctive actions, one can still imagine a built-in stereotypical programme (routine, compare this with computer programmes) set in motion as result of triggering stimuli from the environment (with computers, the external tasks of
click, enter or run) without being consciously planned.
44.7 Setting routines in motion
The research of animal behaviour experts (ethologists) is specifically focused on genetically
pre-determined series of actions and triggering stimuli that set them in
motion (Tinbergen[22]). Building nests, for example, will
only begin at a certain temperature and solar position, and then only in
specific environments. Humans also have any number of such routines, that can be learned partially, and
that do not require further conceptual
capacities. There is a counterpart in psychiatry: the blocking
stimulus is very important. In these cases, setting in motion the
theoretically self-evident routine is blocked. Removing these blockades is an important field in this discipline, and in design education as well. Sometimes attention from others can have a blocking
effect. The idea is to unlearn the blocking habits by becoming conscious of
unspoken pre-suppositions, and going back to their origins.[23]
In order to distinguish between conceptual capacity and routine, one
has to be able to ascertain that the involved series
of actions (or the results they lead to) have not yet taken place in the
given form or context. In exceptional cases, this might
even have to do with a genetic mutation, where co-incidence is the creative factor. Yet when artefacts are repeatedly
created by an organism, this can be ruled out. One is then dealing with creative conceptual capacity (creativity).
44.8 Creativity and routine
Some routines can be learned. This
can be done by aping all actions in the sequence (master-and-apprentice), but people can then only go
through the motions, and then repeatedly follow the recipe. Over time, this becomes routine.
Therefore, a goal-orientated and creative conceptual capacity is initially necessary to finally
develop the automatism that then liberates this conceptual capacity for other tasks. The
dark side of such routines is that one forgets one's pre-suppositions, and can no longer account for
them. They become self-evident actions, also pre-supposed by those watching. This often leads to the case where
those who practice these exercises (and who are often well-known) are bad teachers. The concept of culture can be explained as the collection
of unspoken pre-suppositions during communication: what does not have to be explained
in a certain context, because it is already considered obvious. Some pre-suppositions in a culture
are theoretically no longer capable of being traced: they are already pre-supposed in communication itself.
Language is just such a routine that, when being learned, pre-supposes
creative conceptual capacity to connect words to experience. After that, it
gives wings to creativity, but can ultimately also obstruct it as a collection
of clichés which force themselves in. A new idea often consists of new combinations of
routine ideas. The negation of one or several existing routines and assumptions is an
important source of creativity. The ambiguity of the French word néant is telling: denial and birth. Thus we see in the origins of Impressionism the rejection of the academic notion that objects need to be painted in one colour scale if they are to be to
recognisable.[24] This led to a completely new way of painting.
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Academic Bouguereau Jeune fille se defendant contre l'Amour 1880 Museum University of North Carolina in Wilmington.[25] |
Impressionistic John Singer Sargent, The canvas, 1889, Brooklyn Museum[26] |
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Figure 7 Body or light |
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44.9 Creative conceptual capacity
Creativity assumes a conceptual
capacity according to Harrison et al., and is also implied by Piaget,
though it encompasses more and occurs less frequently than routine. This added
value is attributed to an assumedly goal-orientated quality of human activity. Aimless experimentation (playing) can, however, also lead to
something new (for example the invention of
electrical power, or of Impressionism) when the formation of a goal is only addressed afterwards
(electric motors, light bulbs, computers, Expressionism). A goal-orientated
quality is thus not a pre-condition
for creativity. A desire, goal or schedule of requirements is, after all,
always an assumption of the result, be it an incomplete
idea requiring means-orientated
elaboration.
This
again suggests the question how one can
take an idea to the point that it is no longer an already existing idea.
Let us call such an idea a conception in order to distinguish it from Piaget's
notion of a concept. This question essentially refuses generalisation, and, therefore, predictive empiricism. Empiricism can only study existing pre-suppositions or causes verbally and visually, and not locomotorically
their origins themselves (generating
experience, which usually is temporarily
transferable between master and apprentice). If this were the case, one would
be able to predict new formations, along with their elaborations.
Design would then no longer exist. The requirement of empirical research, i.e. that there be a problem from which an objective can be derived, which then has to be made operational in terms of concepts in order to begin the actual research itself,
pre-supposes the creativity that is needed to devise objectives and to put
concepts into operation. This research cannot therefore entirely solve the
issue of creativity on its own[27].
44.10 Applied combinatorics
In order to achieve recognition as
an empirical researcher, some design researchers let themselves be seduced by
the idea that a design is exclusively
a new combination of existing assumptions (existing routine assumptions regarding
situations, urban ensembles, buildings, constructional elements, building
components, abstracted into types). In this sense, design is a form of applied combinatorics. The defenders of this position
bypass the question how these assumptions themselves ever came about, or they implicitly assume that they
need only indicate a historical co-incidence, like mutations in genetic
evolution.
Yet, the
number of new formations per year, or even per day, makes this pre-supposition
improbable. In addition, one cannot learn to cook exclusively by using a summary of all recipes and ingredients ever devised (like Durand proposes for education of architects).[28] Choosing from this abundance also
assumes this negation, from the perspective of one's own
preferences (discretion), while creativity even pre-supposes, except for new combinations, a rather focused rejection of generally accepted pre-suppositions (operative or typological criticism according to Argan[29] or Tafuri[30], see page ).[31]
44.11 Conceptualising work or its result
In order to
clarify creativity, one must distinguish between the spatial
assumption of the result, and the assumption
of the action or series of actions that lead to it. This demands a
diverse (pattern and process-orientated) conceptual capacity, probably because they use the various senses (sensory and locomotor) as basic
assumption or reference. There was a good reason for construction management to separate from the
architectural profession as a distinct discipline. With this discipline, one that is more orientated to temporal sequences, there is indeed still design, though it is a kind of design based on a
series of generally recognised actions with interim results. There are various series of actions that can lead to the same
result, and the same actions can, in another sequence or in different circumstances,
lead to a different result. This lack of a direct causal
relationship between series of actions and
result is a problem in business management with regard to the empirical model.[32]
44.12 Making imaginations
Despite this division on the process
side of things, the architect (designer of the
result) has to operate on another level of abstraction with a process (work): the management
of consecutive design actions in order to arrive at a design. Let us call this design management. Some designers, like Carel Weeber and Frank Lloyd Wright, claimed to see suddenly the final
result before their eyes as a flash: architects with the magic touch. Drawing is for them just routine elaboration
of the conception. The design itself would then not
be work, but rather inspiration without perspiration.
There are
three reasons for doubt. One has to do with an internal process of theoretical
transformative assumptions, or an experience that smacks of
routine. Furthermore, many renowned designers, especially when working in a
team-context or design competition, insightfully unfold their design process with interim results, which then form the basis for the
subsequent design session. This is also advisable for beginning
design students so that they obtain insight into their own strengths and
weaknesses. Fundamentally, the future of this process is largely
unpredictable; there is always a case of beginning
anew on the basis of what has been already achieved, or parting ways
with what has already been achieved, and falling back on previous phases.
The crucial questions are always, "How do I begin to design? What do I accept from what already exists (including the
previous design results) and what do I reject?"
For designs that are more likely to be completed in phases, the dialogue with paper or screen, or construction of a model, is an
accepted and sometimes crucial phase between taking inventory and analysing effects in the design process. In order to get a better grip on
phases like the scientifically traceable process (without a preordained
sequence), one should not presume a
priori that there is one "best" method
per context (series of phases and their sequences) that one should adopt as
routine for designing in other contexts.
44.13 More design methods than designers
Perhaps
the candid starting point would be that there are just as many design processes
as there are designs. Methodology is then not the establishing of all of these design methods, but
rather "understanding each other's methods". If there is anything that
can be generalised about design, this
is included, but here this involves generating designs and only afterwards
analysing their effects empirically. This evaluation of the
design consists of projecting familiar
relationships onto the new context of the design, and there is always
doubt regarding the validity and reliability of this (see page ). An important part of design
education consists of trying to find the most productive sequences of (nameable) design actions and routines for each individual student.
The disciplines of construction management and design have gone their
separate ways so as to give the designer the opportunity to develop his own
more fruitful dynamics, apart from the construction process and therefore
presumably in the competition of the marketplace. The designer who meshes this
process with that of the standard construction process is lucky, as no differences in phase appear between his creative process and the interim products that the construction process
successively demands. This is the case, for example, with designers who begin
with a grid that establishes the basic structural frame (and thus the position
of the foundation piles as well), and who only later complete the process of adding
the final details that do not need to be known until later in the construction process.
Again, many good designers are inspired precisely by these details in order to use the principles of form
and measure that result from them in a total design.
44.14 Idea and environment
The pre-eminent example of order in
nature, the crystal, grows on the basis of an exogenous contamination. The accidental form of this contamination
extends in the growth of the crystal as dislocation
in the roster, without which the free molecules
would not be able to find any point of application to allow the crystal to
grow. This is a warning for perfectionists. Without small heterogeneities in the air, no raindrops could condense from saturated vapour, and no snowflakes could find a starting
point to grow uniformly in six directions. Some designers need to find at
least one exogenous starting point, even if this seems of secondary
importance, in order to base their integral work upon it.
The remaining context then leads to new dislocations. The starting point is often the specification (of which a schedule of requirements may form a part), or the topography or bordering of a site, but it could also be an artificial
fascination, an impression from the past. The capriciousness of these starting points sometimes awakens the desire to find once again an autonomously continuing idea (for example a grid) from which the constructional
elements derive their dimensions (as in an automatism), and
upon which they can be based. The designers of sweeping, often sudden interventions find precisely therein their formal (morphological) starting point, which can then be projected onto the specification and the site. Yet a crystal is not a
design; it is the result of a physical automatism.
Every homogenous design theme winds up on the borders of the given site; it runs
off into fascinating interim
variants, or
forms remarkable contrasts with the adjoining plot. This dialectic between
homogeneity (or autogeneity) and heterogeneity in the creative conceptual capacity brings us back to Piaget or Fichte. One can also see a relationship with the dualism between idealism (Plato) and realism/relativism (Aristotle), rationalism (Descartes) and empiricism (Hume), the Expressionism and Impressionism of the 19th century, psychological distinction between projection and identification, and methodological distinction between goal-orientated and means-orientated design.